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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
H.

~L

GRIBBLE,
Plaintiff am,d AppeUant,

No. 6224

vs.
~IRS. E~l~IA

COWLEY,

Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT
This is an appeal by appellant, H. ~I. Gribble,
plaintiff below, from a judgment made and entered in
the Seventh District Court of San Pete County, Utah,
on September 27, 1938, and made final on the 19th day
of June, 1939, by the order of said Court overruling
the motion of said plaintiff for a new trial of said
action.
William Hale Gribble, age fourteen years, was a
resident of Gunnison, Utah, and was a student at the
Gunnison High School. On the 13th day of December,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1937, the said William Hale Gribble was riding his
bicycle home after school, and had been riding on the
dirt sidewalk on the East side of Highway No 89, as
the said highway approached the San Pitch Bridge, proceeding in a Northerly direction, and as said decedent
approached the Bridge, he came off of the sidewalk, as
the said highway and sidewalk converged at the Bridge,
and on the main highway, still proceeding in a Northerly direction. He was approximately half-way between
the North and South extremities of the Bridge, and between one and one-half and two feet from the East edge
of the Bridge, when the defendant driving her automobile in the same direction as the decedent was proceeding, · struck the bicycle of the decedent, throwing
him into the air and North of the point of impact. The
decedent was struck in such a way that a severe head
injury at the rear of the head was inflicted, and upon
being taken to the doctor's office in Gunnison, he remained there until he was brought to Salt Lake for
attention at the hospital, where he died on the morning
of the 15th day of December, 1937.
The action was commenced by the serving of summons and the filing of a complaint against the defendant
on the 18th day of March, 1938, and in the complaint
defendant was sued for damages based on the negligence of the defendant herein described. The defendant
filed an answer to the complaint admitting that she
was at the scene of the accident on the day alleged in
the complaint; that she admitted that the automobile
which she was driving and operating did strike upon
and' against the body and bicycle of William Hale
2
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Gribble; that \Yilliam Hale Gribble was by reason thereof thrown and hurled a considerable distance; that upon
the 15th day of December, 1937, the said William Hale
Gribble died from injuries received thereof; but denied
that she was at the time operating or driving her automobile carelessly or negligently, or at a great, excessive
or unlawful rate of speed, or that she carelessly or negligently failed to keep a careful, or any lookout for persons along or upon said highway, or that she carelessly
or negligently failed to have said automobile under control, or that she failed to observe any traffic rule or
regulation required by la-w. The effect of the answer
of the defendant is simply to deny the negligence alleged
in the complaint and there is no defense in this action
of contributory negligence.
The case was tried to a jury starting on the 22nd
day of September, 1938, upon the complaint and answer
filed in this action, and the jury returned a verdict for
the defendant, "no cause of action," in the early morning of September 27, 1938. (Ab. 14).
The plaintiff within time filed his motion for a
new trial. (Ab. 15-16).
In support of his first ground for granting the new
trial, ''misconduct of the jury,'' the plaintiff secured
and served upon counsel for the defendant, and filed
with the Clerk of the Court, the affidavits of two persons,
namely: Mrs. Gladys Nielson and Mrs. H. M. Gribble
(Ab. 16-18). Both affidavits were to the effect that
statements were made in the jury room that even though
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the plaintiff, H. M. Gribble, was entitled to recover, Hale
Gribble was more negligent than Mrs. Cowley at the
scene of the accident, and that the plaintiff because of
the negligence of said Hale Gribble, was not entitled
to recover. Further statements were made that the
cause of the accident was the negligence of Hale Gribble
turning into the car of Mrs. Emma Cowley. (Ab 16-18).
Plaintiff's motion for new trial was argued and
on the 19th day of June, 1939, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. (Ab. 19).

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The errors of the trial court upon which the plaintiff .relies for a reversal of this case are- as follows:

I.
The evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict
in the following particulars:
That there was no issue of contributory negligence
in this trial; that the jury were instructed that the sole
issue in the cause was whether or not the defendant was
negligent as alleged in plaintiff's complaint; and that
there was no evidence of negligence on the part of
William Hale Gribble, the decedent, which said negligence might be imputed to his father, the plaintiff in
this action.
II.
Misconduct of the jury in the following particulars:
4
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(a) Considering· in the jury room and discussing
the negligenee of the defendant and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff's deceased son, when the Court
had given Instruction X o. 14, which instruction stated
that the sole issue in the ea use was the negligence of
the defendant.
(b) That the jury In their jury room discussion
stated that the defendant was guilty of negligence in
causing the death of the decedent, and by deciding that
the defendant, ~Irs. Cowley, was negligent, it then became the duty for the jury to determine just one matter,
to-wit: what amount of damages was sustained by the
plaintiff and render a verdict in that amount.
(c) That the jury considered facts outside of the
scope of the pleadings and trial, namely: contributory
negligence of the decedent, when the sole issue in the
case was the negligence only of the defendant.
(d) That the jury sent word to the Judge in the
cause that they wished further instructions in the case,
and upon being informed that the jury were to read
the instructions and decide the case accordingly, the
jury voted on the verdict and three jurors changed their
verdict, so that the vote was eight to nothing for "no
cause of action," and that the last vote of the jurors
was influenced by the information sent to the jury by
the Judge in the cause. (Ab. 65-66).

5
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ARGUMENT

I.
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The court erred in refusing plaintiff's motion for
new trial for the following reasons :
The pleadings fix the issues to be determined in
the cause as submitted to the jury as to the evidence
adduced at the trial. The complaint alleges that the
defendant was negligent in driving and operating her
automobile carelessly and negligently, and at a great,
excessive and unlawful rate of speed, to-wit: in excess
of 40 miles per hour; that she negligently failed to keep
a careful or any lookout for any persons along and upon
said highway; that she failed to have her automobile
under control and drove and operated said automobile
to the right hand side of the hig~way, and negligently
failed to give any signal whatsoever of her intention
to pass said deceased on his left, and in passing said
decedent, failed to proceed as required by law and ordinances of the City of Gunnison with reference to speed,
sounding of horn and distance of passing on the left.
The defendant entered a general denial of the acts of
negligence alleged by the plaintiff, and did not set up
any plea of contributory negligence of the decedent which
could be imputed to the plaintiff in this case.

A

PLEA OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
NECESSARY, UNLESS PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE
SHOWS NEGLIGENCE.
6
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In the cast:> of Smith vs. Ogden & N. TJ'". R. Co., 33
Utah 1~9; 93 Par. 185, Justice Straup at page 136 of the
Utah Report says:
''The rule obtains in this jurisdiction that
the plaintiff is not required to allege nor prove
in the first instance his freedom from negligence.
He is required to allege and prove negligence on
the part of the defendant, and that such negligence, as a natural and direct result, occasioned
the injury. The burden of proving contributory
negligence is upon the defendant, unless it is
shown by plaintiff's evidence.''
The court further says at page 137:
"If there is no evidence either on the part
of the plaintiff or the defendant on such issue,
the court should not submit that issue to the
jury anymore that it should submit any other
issue to them upon which there is no evidence.
''A plea of contributory negligence is essential onlv to entitle the defendant to introduce evidence in support of such a defense. The
general denial puts in issue such of the general
averments of the complaint as the plaintiff is
bound to prove in order to maintain his action.
Under the general issue, the defendant may introduce any evidence which tends to disprove the
negligence charged against him, or which tends to
disprove the casual connection of his negligence
and the injury; but a plea of contributory negligence is essential to entitle the defendant to introduce evidence which does not tend to disprove
such facts, but which merely tends to prove negligence on plaintiff's part, concurring and combining with the defendant's negligence, and as a
proximate cause contributing to plaintiff's injury. That is to say, the defendant, under the
general issue, may not introduce evidence which
does not tend to disprove his negligence or its
('asual conneetion, or the averments essential to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plaintiff's recovery but which, nevertheless, tends
to relieve him of the legal consequences of his
negligence. To do so a special plea is necessary."
The court further says at page 138:
''But the defendant, under the general issue,
may not show that the plaintiff was guilty of
what in law is termed 'contributory negligence.'

* * * For these reasons the general rule obtains
that the defense of contributory negligence is not
available as a defense, if not specially pleaded,
unless plaintiff's evidence discloses such negligence.''
In the case of Andreason vs. Ogden Railway and
Depot Company, 8 Utah 128, Justice Anderson at page
132 says:
''The question of the negligence of the respective parties was a question which it was the
special province of the jury to determine under
proper instructions from the Court.''
The question of contributory negligence in this case
was not within the scope of the functions of the jury to
decide for the reason that Instruction No 14, delivered
by the Court to the jury, is as follows:
''You are instructed that the sole issue in
this case is a question of whether the defendant
was negligent as alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, or was not negligent, and if you find and
believe from a preponderance of the evidence introduced before you, that the defendant, Mrs.
Emma Cowley, was negligent as defined in these
instructions, then, you shall render a verdict for
the plaintiff and against the defendant and determine the amount of his damage, if any; otherwise if you find that the defendant is not charge8
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able with any aet or aets of negligence alleged
within the complaint, then yon shall render a
verdict for the defendant, 'no cause of aetiou'. "
This Instruction No. 14, limits the issue in the case
to the question of whether or not the defendant, Mrs.
Emma Cowley, was negligent.

B.
DUTY OF JURY TO FOLLOW COURT'S
INSTRUCTION
There can be no argument that it is the duty of a
court during trial to give instructions to the jury as to
the issues inYolYed, and that the jury must follow the
instructions of the court, whether said instructions
be right or wrong.
In the case of Ryan vs. Beaver County 82 Utah 27;
21 Pac (2nd) 858, Justice :Moffat, in writing the opinion
states:
"The jury is bound on questions of law to
yield full obedience to the instructions of the
court, and this applies as well to that part of the
charge defining the issues as made by the pleadings as to the law as declared by the court and
made applicable to the evidence as submitted.''
In the case of City of Decatur vs. Finley, 127 So.
518, the Court at page 518 of the Report says:
''The court erred in its instruction on the
subject of interest. *
* It was the duty of the
jury nevertheless to follow the court's instruction.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the case of Salter vs. TurnPr, 130 So. 163, the
Court at page 164 of the Report says :

"It is essential to an orderly administration of
justice, that the jury should obey the instructions
of the court.''
In the case of Copeland et al vs. Benson Hardware
Company, 131 So. 1, the Court at page 2 of the Report
says:
"It was the duty of the jury to act in accord
to the direct instructions of the court, and, failing so to do, the court properly required this
action by the jury. It has been well said: 'It is
essential to an orderly administration of justice
that juries should obey the instructions of the
court. If the court is in error in giving instructions the jury should, nevertheless, obey the instructions, and the injured party would have recourse by appeal to this court, which is the proper
form to pass upon the actions of the trial court.' ''
In the case of Redo Y Cia vs. First National Bank
of Los Angeles, 200 Cal. 161, 252 Pac. 587, the court at
page 589 of the Report says:

''It is the province and the duty of the court
to instruct the jury upon the law, and such instructions are binding on the latter in its deliberations.''
In the case of Farguet vs. De Senti et al, 148 Atl.
139, the court at page 141 of the Report says:
''The jury is of course, bound to accept and
apply principles of law governing the case before
them.''
10
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In the case of Lol'e l'S. Ft. Dodge, D. 1Jf. and B. R.
Co., 224 N. W. 815, the court at page 819 of the opinion
says
''Courts, and not juries, are to determine
the law, and, when this is done, it is not for the
fact-finding body to disregard it.''
In the case of lrinston vs. McKnab, 134 Kan. 75,
4 Pac. (2nd) 401, the Court at page 403 of the Report

says:
''Each litigant, the defendant no less than
the plaintiff, was entitled to an answer to the
question the jury were impanelled to determine.''
In the case of Pfannebecker vs. Southern R. I. & P.
Ry. Co. 226 N. W. 161, the court at page 162 of the
opinion says:
"Right or wrong, instructions must be followed, for they become the law of the case.
'Courts and not juries are to determine the law
and when this is done, it is not for the factfinding
body to disregard it.' (Citing Cases)."
In the case of Louisville and N. R. Co. vs. Muncey,
17 S. W. (2nd) 423, the court at page 430 of the Report
says:
''And an instruction whether right or wrong
binds the jury, and cannot be disregarded."
In the case of Cooper vs. Girdler, 39 S. W. (2nd)
1009, the court at page 1011 of the Report says:
''It was the duty of the court to base the instructions on the pleading and proof, and the duty
of the jury to follow the instructions.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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''The eQurt instructed the jury, and properly
so, upon that issue. The jury disreg.a~ded the
instructions ; rendered a verdict contrary to the
instructions. Hence the verdict under the opinions of this court, is contrary to the law (Citing
Cases). The rule is generally established that
where a verdict is contrary to the instructions
it is contrary to law and the court is to be authorized to and it is its duty to, set such a verdict
aside and grant a new trial.''
In the case of Wendel vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.~
83 Mont. 252, 272 Pac. 245, the court at page 248 of the
Report says :
'' The.se instruction~, whether right or wrong,
stated the law applicable to the case, and should
hav.e been f.ollowed by the jury in arriving at a
verdict.''
In the case of Thornton et al vs. Wallace et al, 277
Pac. 417, the court at page 418 .of the Report says :
''It being clear that the jury disregarded this
specific instruction, and that the evidence was insuffieient to have justified the verdict as rendered, the verdict is 'contrary to law,' and the
court erred in denying defendant's motion for
new trial. ''
In the case of Alexander Drug Co. vs. Whitaker et al,
146 Okla. 61, 293 Pac. 264, the court at page 266 of the
Report says :
"The jury are not permitted to disregard
the law and the evidence and arbitrate the matters submitted to them according to their own
theories of what may be right between the parties,
which is in reality deciding it merely according to
their own whim, and in disregard of the evidenec
given at the trial."
12
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In the case of TVestern J.l!ontana Ne;tional Bank l'S:
Home Insurance Companyl of New York, 75 l\Iont. 1,6,
241 Pac. 611, the eourt at page 612 of the Report SRys :
"These instructions became the law of the
case, and whether right or wrong, were binding
upon the jury."
In the rase of Daigle us. Rudbeck, 154 Wash. 536,
282 Pac. 827, the court at page 828 of the Report says :

''It was the duty of the jury to follow the law
as given to it by the trial court and as we have
seen by the instruction which we have already
quoted, the jury were told in effect that the plaintiff was entitled to receive such sum as would
fairly and fully compensate him for the injuries
he might be found to have received. * * * Not
having done so, it is apparent that the jury erroneously disregarded our law and failed to follow
the court's instruction and therefore there was
error in the assessment of damages.''

c.
TRIAL COURT ABUSED rrs DLSCRETION IN
FAILING TO GRANT :MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
It is recognized that a motion for new trial is originally addressed to the sound discretion Qf the trial
court, but the contention here is that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to gr.ant the motion for
a new trial.

The Court will remember that this case was tried
before a jury at the end of which a v·erdict, "no cause
of action" in favor of defendant had been returned and
judgment rendered thereon. After this case had gone

13
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to the jury, and the jury had retired to the jury room
for deliberation, certain discussions amongst the
jurors were heard to include statements as to the negligence of the decedent, William Hale Gribble, and that
even though the plaintiff was entitled to recover, because
of the negligence of plaintiff's deceased son, that the
plaintiff, therefore, was not entitled to recover. Statements were also overheard that the decedent had been
more negligent than the defendant at the scene of the
accident. There is no contradiction and no proof contra to
the fact that statements consisting of the element of contributory negligence were discussed within the jury
room. The affidavits attached to the motion for new
trial were those of two independent witnesses that had
overheard the discussions in the jury room, which affidavits appear in the abstract at pages 16, 17 and 18, and
which read as follows :
"AFFIDAVIT
"STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY OF SAN PETE

ss.

"MRS. GLADYS NIELSON, being first duly
sworn, upon oath, deposes and says:
''That on the evening of September 26, 1938,
at about the hour of 9:30 o'clock P. M. of said
day, she was walking in company with her sisterin-law, Mrs. H. M. Gribble, in the Court House
grounds at the Southwest corner of the County
Court House, at Manti, Utah, while the jury was
deliberating in the case of 'H. M. Gribble, plaintiff, vs. Mrs. Emma Cowley, defendant,' and that
during the deliberations of the jury in the above
entitled case, that she heard statements made

14
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within the jury room through the open windows of
the said jury room in substance and effect as follows:
''That eYen though the plaintiff, I-I. l\l. Gribble, was entitled to recover, Hale Gribble was
more negligent than l\lrs. Cowley at the scene of
the accident and that the plaintiff because of the
negligence of said Hale Gribble, was not entitled
to recover.
"That statements were likewise made which
came from said jury room to the effect that Hale
Gribble had been more negligent than Mrs. Cowley.
"That statements were made that the cause
of the accident was the negligence of Hale Gribble turning into the car of Mrs. Emma Cowley.
(SIGNED) J\IIRS. GLADYS NIELSON
''Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th
day of October, 1938.
(SIGNED) D. E. BORG,
Notary Public,
residing at Gunnison.''
"AFFIDAVIT
"STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY OF SAN PETE

I

Jss.

''~IRS. H. M. GRIBBLE, being first duly
sworn upon oath, deposes and says:

''That on the evening of September 26, 1938,
at about the hour of 9:30 o'clock P. M. of said
day, she was walking in company with her sisterin-law, Mrs. Gladys Nielson, in the Court House
grounds at the Southwest corner of the County
Court House at Manti, Utah, while the jury was
deliberating in the case of 'H. M. Gribble, plaintiff, vs. Mrs. Emma Cowley, defendant,' and that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

during the deliberations of the jury in the above
entitled case, that she heard statements made
within the jury room through the open windows
of the said jury room in substance and effect as
follows:
''That even though the plaintiff, H. M. Gribble, was entitled to recover, Hale Gribble, was
more negligent than Mrs. Cowley at the scene of
the accident and that the plaintiff, because of the
negligence of said Hale Gribble, was not entitled
to recover.
''That statements were likewise made which
came from said jury room to the effect that Hale
Gribble had been more negligent than Mrs. Cowley.
"That statements were made that the cause
of the accident was the negligence of Hale Gribble turning into the car of Mrs. Emma Cowley.
(SIGNED) MRS. H. M. GRIBBLE.
''Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th
day of Octo her, 1938.
(SIGNED) D. E. BORG,
Notary Public,
residing at Gunnison. ''
Upon the motion for a new trial, the testimony of
Mrs. Gladys Nielson, Mrs. H. M. Gribble, Alonzo King
and J. Lawrence Lowry was offered and received by the
trial court. The matter was then argued to the court,
and the court then took the same under advisement,
and on the 19th day of June, 1939, denied the motion for
a new trial. The view which was taken by the Court,
I feel is at variance with the authorities for the reason
that the testimony of Mrs. Gladys Nielson and Mrs. H.
M. Gribble was very similar to that as has hereinbefore
been set forth by the affidavits attached to the motion
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for a new trial, and, in addition, testimony of two jurors
was offered and received.
:Mr. Alonzo King, one of the jurors, at the trial of
this rase, testified as follows:

''Q. Your name is Alonzo KingY
''~~. 1les, sir.
'' Q. And you were one of the jurors duly
impanelled in the case of H. M. Gribble vs. Mrs.
Emma Cowley J?
••A. Yes, sir.
'' Q. Was there any statement or any discussion had by and between any of the jurors impanelled with reference to the negligence of the
deceased, William Hale Gribble Y
''A. 1les.
"Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. King, that the discussion from the time, the bulk of the discussion
from the time you returned from dinner on that
evening at the Savoy Hotel was taken up as between the jurors in discussing the relative items
of the negligence of Mrs. Cowley as compared
with the negligence of William Hale Gribble~
''A. 1les.
"Q .. Isn't it a fact, Mr. King, that is almost the entire discussion that was had on that
evening in the jury room~
"A. Yes, sir."
J. Lawrence Lowry, one of the jurors at the trial
of this case testified as follows:
'' Q. First of all, I am sorry we had, to call
you, Mr. Lowry. 1lour name is J. Lawrence
Lowry1

''A.

1l es, sir.
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"Q. You were one of the jurors impanelled
to hear and did hear the case and render a verdict
in the case of H. M. Gribble vs. Mrs. Emma
Cowley?
''A.

I was.

"Q. As a matter of fact, you were designated as Foreman of that particular jury, were
you not1
''A. I was.
"Q. I will ask you, Mr. Lowry, if it isn't
a fact that there was discussion within the jury
room with reference to the relative negligences
as between William Hale Gribble and Mrs. Emma
Cowley on that particular evening 1
''A. There was some.
"Q. I will ask you this then: Isn't it a fact
that most of the time during the deliberations of
the jury on that particular evening was the discussion as between the fact that William Hale
Gribble was negligent and that Mrs. Cowley was
also negligent, and that William Hale Gribble
was more negligent than Mrs Cowley was 1
"A. No, sir, that is not a fact. The most of
the discussion was as to whether Mrs. Cowley was
negligent or not.
'' Q. It is a fact, however, there was a discussion as to the negligence of William Hale
Gribblef

''A.
taken.''

A little discussion, but no ballots

There can be little doubt that, according to the adjudicated cases, the affidavit of the juror is in no different
position than that of the testimony of the juror as to
facts occuring within the jury room during the consideration of the case.

18
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The question arises as to what the juror may testify
to after the decision in any matter.
In the case of Ogden L. & l. Ry. Co. vs. Jones ef al,
51 Utah 62; 168 Pac. 3-!8, Chief Justice Frick at page 70
of the Utah Report says:
''If a juror is actually guilty of misconduct,
one or more of the other jurors may testify to the
facts constituting the alleged misconduct, or the
same may be proved by any witness who observed
and knows the facts.''
In the case of Moulton l'S. Staats, et al, 83 Utah 197,
27 Pac. (2nd) 455, District Judge Christensen at page
458 of the opinion says:
"From the order it is apparent that there
was a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions of the court, which should have satisfied the
court that the verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of such instructions.''
In the case of Farmers' Sav. Bank of Bunch vs.
Smith, 234 N. W. 798, the Court at page 801 of the Report
says:
"We have here a case, however, of assertion
by jurors of matters as facts not shown by the
evidence, yet inducing their conclusions and made
for the purpose of inducing the same conclusion
in the minds of other jurors. On this record the
case presented to the trial court was not one for
the exercise of judicial discretion. It was one on
which plaintiff was entitled to a new trial as
matter of right.''

Iu the case of Hamilton vs. Snyder, 182 Wash. 688,
48 Pac. (2nd) 245, the Court at page 246 of the opinion
says:
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''Our previous cases upon the subject are
collated, discussed and considered in Lyberg vs.
Holz, 145 Wash. 316, 259 P. 1087, and the conclusion there reached follows the pronouncement
of this court in State vs. Parker, supra, and in
Maryland Casualty Co. vs. Seattle Electric Co.,
75 Wash. 430, 134 P. 1097, to the effect that the
court may consider the affidavits of jurors so far
as they state the facts showing misconduct, but
not as they attempt to show the effect of the misconduct upon the verdict.''
In the case of State vs. Parker, 25 Washington 405;
65 Pac. 776, the Court says:
"In considering the affidavits filed, we entirely discard those portions which may tend to
impeach the verdict of the jurors, and consider
only those facts stated in relation to misconduct
of the juror, and which in no way inhere in the
verdict itself. It is not for the juror to say what
effect the remarks may have had upon his verdict, but he may state facts, and from them the
court will determine what was the probable effect
upon the verdict. It is for the court to say whether
the remarks made by the juror in this case probably had a prejudical effect upon the minds of
other jurors. We do not see how any other conclusion can be reached than that they were highly
prejudicial, including, as they did the statement
of alleged damaging facts concerning appellant
which had not been introduced in evidence upon
the trial.''
In the case of Ryan vs. Beaver County, 82 Utah 27,
21 Pac. (2nd) 858; Justice Moffat on page 860 of the
Pacific Report, cites the case of Jensen vs. Utah Ry. Co.,
72 Utah 366 at page 400; 270 Pac. 349, 362, which states
as follows:
20
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'' HoweYer where the committed error is of
such nature or ~haracter a8 calculated to do harm,
or on its face as having the natural tendency to
do so, prejudice will be presumed, until by the
record it is affirmatiYely shown that the error
was not or could not ha,·e been of harmful effect.
Thus, if the appellant shows committed error of
such nature or character, he, in the first instance,
has made a prima facie showing of prejudice. The
burden, or rather the duty of going forward, is
then cast on the respondent to show by the record
that the committed error was not, or could not
have been, of harmful effect. State vs. Cluff, 48
Utah, 102, 158 P. 701; Jackson, State et al. vs.
Feather Rirer & Gibonsville Water Co., 14 Cal.
19; Thelin vs. Stewart, 100 Cal. 372, 34 P. 861;
2 Hayne, New Trial and Appeal (2nd Ed.) pp.
1608-1614. ''
It is the contention of the appellant that error was
committed by the jurors when they discussed the element of contributory negligence during their jury deliberations in this case, and that the testimony of Mrs.
Gladys Nielson, ::\Irs. H. ~I. Gribble, Alonzo King and
J. Lawrence Lowry clearly shows that the argument of
contributory negligence was of such a nature as would
do harm to the plaintiff's rights, or as Justice Moffat
has so well said as the citation is taken from the case
of Jensen 't·s. Utah Ry. Co., supra, that on its face the
discussion of the item of contributory negligence would
have a natural tendency to do harm, and it is earnestly
suggested that prejudice should be presumed as against
the rights of the plaintiff in this action. Further the
record does not show that the error was not, or could
not have been of any harmful effect as there was no
testimony on the part of the defendant other than the
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cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses on the
motion for new trial. Citations upon the subject could
be multiplied almost without end and various cases
could be brought to the court's attention, but we think
that the rule is amply set forth by the decisions of our
own State.
D.

THAT THE LAST VOTE OF THE JURORS WAS
INFLUENCED BY THE INFORMATION SENT TO
THE JURY BY THE JUDGE IN THE CASE.
The jury had taken several ballots on attempting
to reach a verdict in this case, when the jury requested
along in the early morning of September 27, 1938, that
the Judge render further instructions in this case. This
information was obtained on the motion for new trial,
as follows:
J. Lawrence Lowry, a witness for the plaintiff on
motion for new trial, testified as follows :

"Q. The request was made by the jurors
in that particular case for further instruction,
was it not, on that night or the following morning~

''A. Well, we called to inform him we
weren't together.
'' Q. Immediately after the discussion on
the information by which the Judge informed you
that you would have to read the instructions and
decide the case thereupon, or something to that
effect, a jury verdict was reached, was it not~

''A.

Yes, sir.''
22
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Alonzo King, a witness for the plaintiff on motion
for new trial, testified on direct examination by :\1 r.
Beatie, as follows:

"Q. Was it not a fart that immediately after
the Court, or immediately after the jury had requested further instructions, or some instruction from the Judge, that a ballot was taken upon
this particular verdict, and that it was eight to
nothing at that time~
"A. Yes."
Alonzo King on cross examination by Mr. Erickson,
testified, as follows :
'' Q. You voted in the negative 1 You voted
with the Gribble's stand up to the last, didn't
you~

''A.

Yes, sir.

'' Q. You were the juror that hung out,
weren't you~

''A.

I was one of them.''

It is earnestly contended that the word sent back
to the jury in this cause in the early morning hour when
they requested further instructions from the court, influenced the jury to such an extent that immediately a
ballot was taken to get rid of the case, at which time
the ballot was changed from the previous count of five
to three, to the final ballot of eight to nothing, and upon
which verdict the jury then rendered the verdict of ''no·
cause of action.''

When it is looked into and understood that the
jurors impanelled to try this case were mostly farmers
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and ranchers, they were very reluctant to sit up all
night discussing this case in attempting to reach a verdict. When the court advised them to read the instructions and decide the case, the jurors naturally resented
that situation for the reason that they had informed the
Judge that they could not get together, and for that
reason asked for further instructions with the result
that it was detrimental and harmful to the plaintiff's
law suit, so much so that the jury immediately arrived
at a verdict in order to relieve themselves of any more
discussion in the early morning hours of September 27,
1938, such that the jury was wrongfully influenced into
reaching a verdict without thought as to the facts they
were to decide the issue upon.
In conclusion it is submitted that the evidence is
uncontradicted and clear that the jury discussed an issue
outside of the realm of their jurisdiction to decide, according to the testimony adduced in this case. The effect which was had upon the jury by reason of discussing the contributory negligence of William Hale Gribble,
the deceased, cannot in any way be measured as to what
influence it had upon any or all of the jurors impanelled
in this case. It is the belief of the writer of this brief
that it was wholly through a misapprehension of the
issues on this case on the part of the jury, that the question of contributory negligence was even discussed, for
it is very seldom that a personal injury case is tried in
which the defense of contributory negligence is not used,
and it would be most natural for the jurors to assume
that the discussion of contributory negligence was a proper element in the case for the reason that laymen might
24
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yery easily misunderstand or misconstrue the effect of
the instructions of the rourt who arts from a legal standpoint and in which naturally the wording of any instruction is peculiar to the legal profession and understood by
it, ·where it might Yery easily be misunderstood by any
juror impanelled in this, or any other case.
CONCLUSION
By way of resume, and in conclusion, the plaintiff
and appellant submits:
First: That this court should reverse the judgment
entered by the trial court in this action because of the
error of the court committed in the denial of plaintiff's
motion for a new trial based on the testimony of Mrs.
Gladys Nielson, l\Irs. H. M. Gribble, Alonzo King and J.
Lawrence Lowry, showing that contributory negligence
was discussed in the jury room and that the effect of the
statement was prejudicial to the plaintiff's cause of
action.
Second: Influencing the jury to render a verdict
when they asked for further instructions and were told
to read the instructions and decide the case, which resulted in an immediate change in the voting of certain
jurors who were in favor of a verdict for plaintiff, such
that their vote was changed to favor the defendant for
no cause of action.

Respectfully submitted,

W. D. BEATIE,
Attorney for Plaintiff
a;nd Appellant.

25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

